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Abstract
This paper investigates whether corporate governance has an impact on dividend
policy in Australian listed firms. The empirical studies of corporate governance and
dividend policy in the Australian context tend to have a limited scope and the findings
are mixed. Unlike the existing literature, this paper provides a more comprehensive
examination of the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance
mechanisms. Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period of 2005
to 2011 and the panel data approach, this study finds that dividend payout is
significantly positively (negatively) correlated with board size, board independence,
institutional ownership and use of a Big-4 audit firm (CEO duality and managerial
ownership). Moreover, dividend yield is significantly positively (negatively)
correlated with managerial ownership (foreign ownership). These findings suggest
that dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms are complementary i.e.
firms paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in good governance practices
as well as having strong monitoring and control systems in place and therefore both
dividend policy and corporate governance are considered as effective tools in
reducing agency costs.
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1.

Introduction

The dividend policy is one of the most debatable issues in corporate finance
literature. It attracts particularly the interest of shareholders being a major
financial policy and decision that matters to business. Notably, dividend policy
varies over time, between firms and across countries, especially between
developed and emergentcapital markets. In countries governed by Common
Law regulations with strong shareholder protection, companies distribute
higher dividends than those in Civil Lawcountries with weaker shareholder
protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). Maury
and Pajuste (2002) used two approaches to explain how dividend policy
mitigates agency problems. The first method is the outcomes model. This
approach considers dividend policy as a result of the conflict between majority
shareholders and minority shareholders; and between managers (the agent)
and shareholders (the principal). The second method is the substitute model.
This approach argues that manager opportunism can be reduced by appropriate
dividend policies. The substitution model suggests that firms with weak
minority interests try to establish a reputation by paying dividends (La Porta
et al., 2000). Easterbrook (1984) asserts that the dividend policy may be used
to reduce agency cost and mitigate agency conflict between minority and
majority shareholders by restraining expropriations by senior management
and removing corporate wealth from the control of top managers (Faccio,
Lang, & Young, 2001). Further, Mehrani et al. (2011) point out that corporate
governance is a factor affecting dividend policy.
Australia is a developed economy in the Asia-Pacific region with a strong
financial market providing strong legal protection for shareholders. The
Australian financial market follows the Anglo-American system of corporate
governance. The Corporate Governance Council published the ASX
Corporate Governance Principles (first edition) in 2003, (ASX, 2003). A
subsequent revision was released in 2007 and new recommendations on
diversity and the composition of the remuneration committee were added in
2010 (second edition). The practices of corporate governance have been
widely studied in Australia, however, the research that links corporate
governance to dividend policy is still scarce. Cotter and Silvester (2003),
Setia- Atmaja, Tanewski, and Skully (2009), Alias, Rahim, Nor, and
Yaacob (2012) and Yarram and Dollery (2015) are among the few studies
that investigated the relationship between dividend payout behaviour and
internal corporate governance mechanisms. In the early study, Cotter and
Silvester (2003) found no relationship between board independence and
dividend policy among large ASX listed companies. In contrast, Setia-Atmaja
et al. (2009), Alias et al. (2012) and Yarram and Dollery (2015) documented
a significant positive relationship between board independence and dividend
payout. Thus, the question whether good corporate governance practises to
have a higher proportion of independent board of director will yield more
dividends is inconclusive.
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The motivation of this study derives from the need to demonstrate how
dividend policy can help corporate governance practices to mitigate agency
conflict and protect the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. This
implies whether dividend policy and corporate governance practices play
complementary roles in reducing agency costs that have far-reaching
implications for shareholders, investors and stakeholders in a firm. A strong
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance practices can
be perceived that firms paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in
good governance practices and vice versa. These firms are well equipped with
strong monitoring and control systems to safeguard against managerial
opportunism and tunnelling of fund. Therefore, the motivation and
contribution of the study are of four folds. First, previously Australian studies
tend to focus on the impact of board independence on dividend payout
decision. However, our study offers a more comprehensive examination of the
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms
in all aspects of board independence, board size, board meeting frequency,
CEO duality, audit committee independence, audit quality, managerial
ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and government
ownership. To our best knowledge, there is limited research particularly on the
relationship between audit committee independence, audit quality and
managers' dividend payout decision.
Second, the empirical evidence of corporate governance and dividend policy
in the Australian context not only has a limited scope but also the findings are
mixed. For example, the findings of board independence and dividend payout
are contrary between Cotter and Silvester (2003) and Setia-Atmaja et al.
(2009), Alias et al. (2012), and Yarram and Dollery (2015). Therefore, we are
motivated to re-examine the issue and to add more evidence to the existing
literature.
Third, Yarram and Dollery (2015) suggest that CEO duality has a significant
positive influence on the dividend payout of Australian dividend paying firms.
Unlike Yarram and Dollery (2015), we also consider a full sample including
both dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying firms to investigate to
what extent CEO duality has been an effective corporate governance
mechanism in monitoring managers; or whether CEO duality is simply a
reflection of managerial opportunistic behaviour when it comes to the decision
whether or not firm should pay dividends to existing shareholders.
Fourth, contrasting with Shamsabadi, Min and Chung (2016) who use
aggregate governance index, we take into account the dynamic effect of
corporate governance that not all the corporate governance mechanisms are
effective in assuring that managers will exercise decision in the best interesting
of shareholders. Therefore, instead of focusing on the aggregate corporate
governance index, the interplay between the individual elements of corporate
governance is crucial because different board characteristics may have a
different impact on decision making as whether to pay or not to pay dividends
and how much cash should be distributed in the form of dividend. Our
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approach by taking a comprehensive examination of 11 individual corporate
governance mechanisms captures the dynamic relations between governance
and dividend policy. We argue that firms paying higher dividends could signal
good governance practices and management commitment in reducing free
cash flows and hence reducing agency costs.
Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2011
and the panel data approach, this study reports the significant positive
associations between dividend payout and board size, board independence,
institutional ownership, and Big-4 audit firm. However, dividend payout is
found to have a significant negative relationship with CEO duality and
managerial ownership. Moreover, when dividend policy is measured by
dividend yield, managerial ownership shows a significant positive impact
while foreign ownership is significant negative. The findings of the
relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy have
important implications for companies, investors and policy makers. These
results imply that board size, board independence, institutional ownership,
Big-4 firms, and dividend policy can play complementary governance roles
and provide more benefits to shareholders and investors. Firms that pay higher
dividends are more likely to display good governance of the monitoring and
control systems in place. Therefore, both dividend policy and corporate
governance are considered an effective tool in reducing agency costs in
Australian firms.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 considers the literature review,
conceptual framework and hypotheses development; Section 3 describes the
research method covering data sources and sample selection, variable
measurement and model development; Section 4 presents and discusses the
results; and Section 5 reports the conclusion and implication of the study.
2.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

2.1

Board structure and dividend policy

Board structure is an important factor that may influence a firm’s payout
policy. Board structure includes its size and the proportion of directors who
are independent. The board of directors plays a vital role in protecting
shareholders’ interests and ultimately decides a firm’s dividend payout. A
number of empirical studies have tested the relationship between board
structure and dividend policy but, nonetheless, the results are mixed. Elmagrhi
et al. (2017) examines a sample of UK small and medium-sized enterprises
from the period of 2010 to 2013 and they find that board size and audit
committee size are significantly positively associated with the level of
dividend payout. La Porta et al. (2000), Mitton (2004), Kowalewski et al.
(2008), and Yarram and Dollery (2015) show that companies with good
governance practices pay higher dividends. However, other studies such as
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Gugler (2003) and Jiraporn and Ning (2006)
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show that firms with poor governance pay higher dividends. Bathala and Rao
(1995) and Borokhovich et al. (2005) examine the relationship between
corporate governance characteristics and dividend policy in US firms and
report a significant negative relationship between board independence and
dividend payout ratio. Similar findings were discovered by Al-Najjar and
Hussainey (2009), Asamoah (2011), Al-Shabibi and Ramesh (2011), Bathala
and Rao(1995), and Benjamin and Zain (2015).
Other studies have found a positive relationship between board independence
and dividend policy. Schellenger et al. (1989) examined the effect of board
compositionon the dividend payout for a sample of 526 US companies and
found a significant positive relationship between board composition and
dividend policy. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) studied 160 US firms during the
period from 1980 to 1983 and found that outside directors are less likely to
reduce dividend payout which is consistent with Schellenger et al. (1989).
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) also confirm that board independence is
significant positively related to dividend policy. Alias et al. (2012) found a
significant positive impact of board independence on dividends. In Australia,
Cotter and Silvester (2003) analysed 109 large companies listed on the ASX
in 1997 to examine whether board independence affected dividend policy. The
results indicated board independence has no relationship with dividend policy.
Yarram and Dollery (2015) found evidence that board independence
positively affects dividend payout.
In addition, Belden et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between outside
directors and dividend payout for 524 large companies listed in the Forbes 500
for theyears 1998 to 2000. They showed that firms with a higher proportion of
outside directors prefer to pay higher levels of dividends. Abdelsalam et al.
(2008) examined the top 50 firms on the Egyptian Stock Exchange from 2003
to 2005 and their findings reveal that institutional ownership has a significant
positive association with dividend policy, while board composition has no
relationship with dividend payout. Elmagrhi et al. (2017) document a
significant negative effect of frequency of board meeting on the level of
dividend payout in the UK listed SMEs. Benjamin and Zain (2015) also
reported firms that meet more frequently usually pay lower dividends. Onthe
contrary, a positive view in the literature is that more frequency of board
meetings is beneficial for firms as part of their board monitoring and good
corporate governance practice. Based on the above discussion, the hypotheses
relating to board size, board independence and board meeting are developed:
H1a: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and board
size.
H1b: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and board
independence.
H1c: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and board
meetings.
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2.2

CEO duality and dividend policy

According to Agency theory, the separation of board chairman and CEO
functions will reduce agency costs and improve firm performance. Moreover,
the duality of CEO and board chair is one of the most controversial issues in
corporate governance literature. On the contrary, Stewardship Theory argues
that leaders are trustworthy, they are not opportunistic and they act in the
interests of the company. Advocates of duality argue that CEOs will have a
strong leadership in their dual roles and tend to produce a superior firm
performance. A number of researchers have investigated the association
between CEO duality and dividend policy. Using a sample of 2,081 firms
covering the period from 1992 to 2000, Hu and Kumar (2004) examined the
effects of internal governance mechanisms on dividend payout. The results
show a significant positive association between CEO duality and dividend
policy. Similarly, Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) found a positive relationship
between CEO duality and dividend payout among real estate investment trusts.
Feng et al. (2007) and Gill and Obradovich (2013) report that CEO duality has
a significant positive effect on dividend policy. Chen et al. (2017) also find a
positive relationship between CEO duality and dividend payout, suggesting
firms with combined leadership tend to pay high dividends in order to
substitute for poor governance reputation. These empirical findings by large
are consistent with the substitute theory. However, Sharma (2011) has an
opposite finding that shows a negative association between CEO duality and
dividend payout policy. Baliga et al. (1996) and Dittmar et al. (2003) found
that firms with CEO duality are less effective. CEO duality is negatively
correlated with the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, and
weak corporate governance mechanisms lead to a higher level of agency cost
(D’Souza & Saxena, 1999). The negative association between the CEO duality
and corporate dividend policy was also found by Asamoah (2011), Chen et
al. (2011), Subramaniam and Devi (2011), Alias et al. (2012) and Abor and
Fiador (2013). Moreover, Elmagrhi et al. (2017) examines a sample of UK
small and medium-sized enterprises listed on the Alternative Investment
Market and they find that CEO role duality has no impact on the level of
dividend payout. Considering the mixed findings in the literature, we develop
the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a negative relationship between dividend policy and CEO
duality.
2.3

Audit committee independence and dividend policy

The audit committee plays a key role in corporate governance and
safeguarding the financial interest of shareholders (Abbott et al., 2004). In the
vein of Agency theory, Erickson et al. (2003) argued that audit committee
independence reduces agency costs. To our best knowledge, there is limited
research on the relationship between audit committee and dividend policy and
the tests of audit committee independence and dividend payout are
inconclusive. For example, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that dividend policy
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has a significant negative relationship with governance mechanisms. Chen et
al. (2005) found a marginally significant negative association between audit
committee independence and dividend payout. Sawicki (2009) found that
dividends act as a substitute mechanism for other governance mechanisms in
pre-crises contexts; however, a positive association exists between dividend
and corporate governance in post-crises situations. This means that the
dividend can be used as a substitute for governance mechanisms. Turley and
Zaman (2007) examined the effectiveness of audit committees in UK
companies and found that audit committee is not that important an internal
control. In a recent study, Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2014) found no significant
relationship between audit committee independence and cash dividends in the
UK. Similarly, Nimer et al. (2012) found no significant relationship between
audit committee independence and dividend payout policies. However, the
independence of audit committees increases its strength and reduces the
agency problem and the opportunity to misappropriate funds by insiders (Yeh,
Chung, & Liu, 2011). Based on the mixed findings in the literature, the
hypothesis is formulated as:
H3: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and audit
committee independence.

2.4

Ownership structure and dividend policy

Board structure is not the only factor influencing a firm’s payout policy.
Researchers suggest that ownership structure, for example, managerial
ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership and foreign
ownership may also affect dividend policy decisions. Rozeff (1982) and
Farinha (2003) analysed the association between managerial ownership and
dividend policy and they found that managerial ownership is negatively
related with dividend policy. This is because managers tend to minimize
dividends in order to increase their personal benefits such as compensations
(e.g., Eckbo & Verma, 1994; Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995; Short, Zhang,
& Keasey, 2002). McConnell and Servaes (1990), Short et al. (2002), Manos
(2003), Chen et al. (2005) also provide evidence that managerial ownership is
negatively related to dividend payout.
Apart from managerial ownership, institutional shareholders may also have an
impacton a firm's dividend policy. Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory points
out that institutional investors play an effective role in monitoring managers
as they will put pressure on managers to distribute free cash flow as dividends.
Dividends, therefore, can be also viewed as the reward to compensate
institutional investors for monitoring management activities (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986). However, empirical studies of the relationship between
institutional ownership and dividend policy show mixed results, for example
including Alli, Khan, and Ramirez (1993), Moh'd et al. (1995), Short et al.
(2002), Grinstein and Michaely (2005), and Khan (2006). In the emerging
markets, Abdelsalam et al. (2008), Sharif et al. (2010), and Al-Nawaiseh
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(2013) finda significant positive relationship. On the other hand, Han et al.
(1999), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003),
Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), Kouki and Guizani (2009), Mehrani et al.
(2011), and Gill and Obradovich (2013) find a negative relationship between
institutional ownership and dividend payout. In addition, Zeckhauser and
Pound (1990) and Al-Najjar (2010) show no significant association between
institutional shareholders and dividend policy.
Government ownership is also documented to have an impact on a firm's
dividend policy. Gul (1999) provided evidence that the number of shares
owned by the government is significant positively associated with dividend
policy. A similar relationship was found by Al-Malkawi (2007) that a higher
level of government ownership is associated with higher levels of cash
dividends. Other studies, such as Wei, Zhang, and Xiao (2004) and Bradford,
Chen, and Zhu (2013) also show a significant positive association between the
number of shares owned by government and dividend policy.
Foreign investors may also influence the level of dividend payout. Firms with
higher proportions of shares held by foreign investors are more likely to pay
higher dividends (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Gedailovic, Yoshikawa,
and Hashimoto (2005) found that the number of shares owned by foreign
investors has a significant positive relationship with the level of dividends.
Similarly, Jeon, Lee, and Moffett (2011) confirm a significant positive effect
of foreign investors on dividend policy. The positive relationship between
foreign ownership and dividend policy is also supported by Kang and Stulz
(1997), Manos (2003), Chai (2010), Jeon et al. (2011), Warrad, Abed,
Khriasat, and Al-Sheikh (2012), Chiang and Lai (2013), and Gong (2015).
Thus, we develop the following hypothesis:
H4a: There is a negative relationship between dividend policy and
managerial ownership.
H4b: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and
institutional ownership.
H4c: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and
government ownership.
H4d: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and
foreign ownership.
2.5

External audit and dividend policy

Mitton (2004) found a significant positive relationship between audit quality
as measured by Big-4 audits and dividend policy. Similarly, Trang (2012)
found that audit quality has a significant positive effect on dividend policy.
Big-4 audit firms tend to provide quality-auditing services because they are
highly skilled with more experiences and incentives to defend their reputation
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005;
Kane & Velury, 2004; Piot, 2005).Deshmukh (2003) reports that companies
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with weak audit quality are more likely to show information asymmetry and
pay lower cash dividends. This implies there should be a significant positive
association between audit quality, as measured by involvement of Big-4
audits, and dividend polices. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H5: There is a positive relationship between dividend policy and audit
quality.

3.

Research Method and Data

This study collected data from multiple secondary sources. The financial data
are hand-collected from the annual reports published by Australian listed
companies. Corporate governance data are collected from DataStream and
SIRCA databases. Thefinal sample is a balanced panel data set consisting of
1,438 firm-year observations for 206 listed companies across the period from
2005 to 2011. The main reason for this sample period is the adoption of ASX
Corporate Governance Guidelines in 2003 (first edition) and its subsequent
revision in 2007 and 2010 (second edition) rather than third edition (2014) or
fourth edition (2019) that include wide range of recommendations. These
guidelines are generally voluntary in nature that firms have followed since
then. The base period 2005 represents corporate governance practices with
one-year lag from 2003 while 2011 being the last period before a
comprehensive review of guidelines occurred in 2012 reflecting global
developments on corporate governance (ASX, 2013). In addition, the study
period 2005-2011 represents relatively stable economic conditions,
notwithstanding Global Financial Crisis (GFC), with series of interest rate cuts
as well as volatility spikes in the stock market and exchange rate fluctuations
from time to time.
With panel data pooled OLS regression, the estimation may be problematic
because the process ignores the panel structure and only treats data as crosssectional (Arellano & Honoré, 2001; Roodman, 2009). Many empirical studies
have used OLS regression to estimate the relationship between corporate
governance and dividend policy. However, the OLS estimates are inconsistent
and inefficient if there exists heterogeneity across firms (Hsiao, 2003). In
addition, using OLS in a panel data structure may lead to temporary and spatial
problems and spurious results (Beck & Katz, 1995). The fixed effects model
may be used to analyse the impact of variables that change over time. The
fixed effects model removes the effects of those time- invariant characteristics.
The random effects model can be used to analyse the special features of panel
data. It is also known as the error components model. In the random effects
regression, the intercepts are similar for all cross-sectional units and the
random variation of each entity's intercept is captured by the error term 𝜀ᵢ. In
choosing whether to use the fixed effects and random effects model, we
applied the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The
null hypothesis is that random effects is preferred and the alternative
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hypothesis is that fixed effects is preferred. A significant p-value leads to the
rejection of the null hypothesis and indicates that the fixed effects is more
appropriate. We model dividend policy as a function of board size, board
independence, board meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit committee
independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, government
ownership, foreign ownership and audit quality.
Dividend Policy = α+β1 BSIZE + β2 BIND + β3 BMEET
+β4 DUALITY +β5 ACIND+β6 INSID +β7 INS +β8
STATE +β9 FRGN +β10 BIG-4 +∑ X+ µ
Where, dividend policy is a dependent variable measured by dividend payout
ratio (POUT) and dividend yield (DY). The independent variables are
corporate governance variables and include board size (BSIZE), board
independence (BIND), board meetings (BMEET), CEO duality (DUALITY),
audit committee independence (ACIND), managerial ownership (INSID),
institutional ownership (INS), government ownership (STATE), foreign
ownership (FRGN), and audit quality (BIG-4). ∑X is avector of other control
variables and includes firm size, leverage, growth prospect, firm risk, firm age
and profitability, and µ is the error term. Table 1 below provides the
measurement of variables and data sources.
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Table 1: Variable Measurements and Data Sources
Variables

Measurements

Symbols

Dependent variables
Dividend Payout The percentage of earnings paid to shareholders in dividends.
Ratio
Calculated as the dividends per share divided by
earnings per share.
Dividend Yield The percentage of a company pays out in dividends

Independent variables
Board Size
The board size for firm i in time t. It is calculated as the
numbers of board directors.
Board
The independent of board of directors for firm i in time t. It
Independence
is calculated as the proportion of outside independentdirectors.
Board Meetings
CEO Duality
Audit
Committee
Independence
Managerial
Ownership

Calculated as the numbers of board directors meeting
during a financial year t.
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm’s CEO is
the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and 0 otherwise.
The proportion of independent directors on the auditcommittee for firm i in
time t.
The percentage of shares owned by board of directors for
firm i in time t.
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Data Sources
DataStream & Annual Reports

POUT
DY

DataStream &

BSIZE
BIND

DataStream, Sirca
& Annual Reports
DataStream, Sirca& Annual Reports

BMEET

Annual Reports

DUALITY

Annual Reports

ACIND

DataStream & Annual Reports

INSID

Annual Reports
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Institutional
Ownership
Government
Ownership
Foreign
Ownership
Audit Quality
Control variables
Firm Size
Leverage Ratio
Growth
Firm Risk
Firm Age
Profitability
Industry
Dummy
Year Dummy

The percentage of shares owned by institutions investors
for firm i in time t.
The percentage of shares owned by government for firm i
in time t.
The percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals
and institutional investors for firm i in time t.
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm is audited by a
big four audit firm, and 0 otherwise.

INS

Annual Reports

STATE

Annual Reports

FORGN

Annual Reports

BIG_4

Annual Reports

Calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets for
FSIZE
firm i in time t.
Calculated by total liabilities over total assets for the firm i
LR
in time t.
Calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s
MBVE
market value per share to its book value per share.
Standard deviation of earnings (Beta). It is calculated as
FRISK
the historical beta local index for firm i in time t.
Calculated as the number of years elapsed since the firm
FAGE
was incorporated.
Calculated as the earnings before taxes to book value of
ROA
the firm’s total assts.
The industry classification is based on Global IndustryClassification
INDS-DUM
Standards (GICS) for Australian listed
companies and equals to 1 if firm i is from the GICSindustry, and 0 otherwise.
Year dummy equals to 1 if year 2005, and 0 otherwise.

YR-DUM
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DataStream
DataStream
DataStream
DataStream
Company Website
DataStream
ASX Website

AABFJ | Volume 15, No.4, 2021

4.

Empirical Results

4.1

Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. Panel
A shows that the mean (median) values of POUT and DY are 58% (60%) and
5% (4%) respectively. Panel B shows that average board size (BSIZE) and
board independence (BIND) of Australian firms is between 7 to 8 directors
with 59.7% independent members. The average number of board meetings
(BMEET) is 9 to 10 times in a year.Only 4.2% of the Australian firms are
characterized as CEO-Chairman duality, which means that most Australian
firms have separate positions for a chairman and chief executive officer. The
mean (median) of the proportion of audit committee independence is 85.7%
(100%). More than 80% of firms use Big-4 audit firms that indicates high audit
committee independence and high audit quality. In the ownership categories,
it appears that both institutional (25.2%) and foreign ownerships (28.1%) are
dominating over insider managerial ownership (15.2%).
Table 3 shows the correlation between corporate governance mechanisms and
dividend variables for Australian firms. The results suggest that the degree of
correlation between the independent variables is low which suggests there are
no multi-collinearity problems between independent variables. This study
also used the variance inflation factors (VIF) of variables to determine if the
multi-collinearity problem exists between independent variables. Again,
coefficients of correlation are within an acceptable range of VIF results 1.03
– 1.50 for Australian listed firms, that are smaller than 10 (see Appendix). The
results of VIF support the Pearson’s correlation coefficients and provide no
indication of multi-collinearity problems in the regression models.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Variables (N = 1438)
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std

P25th

P50th

P75th

percentile

percentile

Percentile

Min

Max

Skewness

Kurtosis

Panel A: dividend policy
Dividend Payout Ratio (POUT)

1438

0.577

0.274

0.400

0.600

0.790

0.000

1.000

-0.4305

2.3917

Dividend Yield (DY)

1438

0.045

0.034

0.024

0.040

0.059

0.000

0.279

2.0136

10.4808

Board Size (BSIZE)

1438

7.640

2.706

6.000

7.000

9.000

2.000

0.7328

4.1862

Board Independence (BIND)

1438

0.597

0.196

0.500

0.625

0.750

0.000

-0.3483

2.3447

Board Meetings (BMEET)

1438

9.578

4.839

6.000

9.000

12.000

0.000

0.9695

4.9990

CEO Duality (DUALITY)

1438

0.042

0.200

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

1.000

4.5837

22.0102

Audit Committee Independence (ACIND)

1438

0.857

0.205

0.750

1.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

-1.2698

3.7178

Managerial Ownership (INSID)

1438

0.152

0.112

0.070

0.120

0.210

0.000

0.770

1.2524

4.9040

Institutional Ownership (INS)

1438

0.252

0.126

0.159

0.232

0.332

0.029

0.872

1.0171

5.1582

Government Ownership (STATE)

1438

0.005

0.041

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.520

10.1012

112.9688

Foreign Ownership (FORGN)

1438

0.281

0.134

0.180

0.270

0.378

0.000

0.930

0.3716

2.9904

Audit Quality (BIG-4)

1438

0.808

0.394

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

-1.5645

3.4477

Log Firm Size (FSIZE)

1438

13.101

2.257

11.500

13.140

14.800

4.750

-0.1042

2.7421

Leverage Ratio (LR)

1438

0.235

0.204

0.089

0.213

0.332

-1.634

1.653

0.6768

14.6667

Log Growth (MBVE)

1438

0.758

0.786

0.223

0.732

1.255

-1.897

3.999

0.1674

3.4091

Firm Risk (FRISK)

1438

1.245

0.801

0.720

1.130

1.650

-2.570

5.640

0.8669

6.0653

Panel B: Corporate Governance Variables
23.000
1.000
37.000

Panel C: Control Variables
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Firm Age (FAGE)

1438

43.258

42.106

13.000

26.000

56.000

0.000

187.00

Profitability (ROA)

1438

0.053

0.240

0.006

0.068

0.145

-1.727

1.351

STATE

FORGN

1.3925

3.9935

-1.6206

13.0262

Table 3: Pearson Correlation of Variables (N = 1438)
POUT
POUT
DY

DY

BSIZE

BIND

BMEET

CEO Duality

ACIND

INSID

INS

BIG-4

LOG FSIZE LR

1.000
0.495***

1.000

BSIZE

0.042*

0.070***

1.000

BIND

0.080***

0.002

-0.012

1.000

BMEET

0.101***

0.074***

0.191***

0.108***

1.000

CEO DUALITY

-0.025

-0.045*

-0.008

-0.085***

-0.088***

1.000

ACIND

-0.010

0.018

-0.054**

0.098***

0.007

0.006

1.000

INSID

-0.033

-0.009

0.018

-0.114***

-0.018

0.193***

-0.001

1.000

INS

0.044*

-0.040

0.003

0.004

-0.080***

-0.023

-0.004

-0.008

1.000

STATE

0.017

0.024

-0.045*

0.032

0.072***

-0.027

-0.038

-0.072***

-0.024

1.000

FORGN

0.021

0.015

0.020

-0.026

0.071***

-0.030

0.048**

0.033

-0.033

0.017

BIG-4

0.168***

0.076***

0.287***

0.153***

0.242***

-0.013

0.027

-0.012

0.002

0.035

0.121***

1.000

LOG FSIZE

0.096***

0.041

0.385***

0.205***

0.382***

-0.104***

0.078***

-0.063**

-0.078***

0.112***

0.085***

0.443***

LR

0.097***

0.085***

0.065**

0.078***

0.174***

-0.072***

-0.016

0.067**

-0.016

0.011

-0.034

0.138***

0.300***

1.000

0.044*

0.213***

-0.012

-0.019

-0.108***

0..008

-0.032

0.047*

0.127***

0.017

0.001

-0.007

-0.129***

-0.046*

FRISK

-0.104***

-0.047*

-0.072***

-0.109***

-0.091***

0.081***

-0.067**

0.003

-0.066**

-0.004

-0.034

-0.155***

-0.225***

-0.140***

FAGE

0.060**

-0.059**

0.218***

0190***

0.090***

-0.030

0.010

0.022

0.047*

0.205***

0.396***

0.059**

LOG MBVE

-0.139***

1.000

-0.062**

1.000
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ROA

0.004

-0.065***

0.120***

0.069***

0.129***

-0.077***

-0.009

0.044*

0.001

0.014

0.057**

*** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-talied); ** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-talied); * Denotes correlation is significant at the level
0.10 level (2-talied). All variables are as previously defined.
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0.178***

0.282***

0.103***
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Pearson Correlation of Variables (N = 1438)
LOG

FRISK

FAGE

ROA

MBVE
LOG MBVE

1.000

FRISK

0.020

1.000

FAGE

-0.019

-0.0210***

1.000

ROA

0.108***

-0.107***

0.098***

1.000

*** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-talied); ** Denotes correlation is significant at
the 0.05 level (2-talied); * Denotes correlation is significant at the level 0.10 level (2-talied). All variables
are as previously defined.

4.2

Panel regression results

Tables 4 and 5 present the panel regression results for the relationship between
corporate governance variables and dividend policy for Australian firms. Both
the pooled OLS and panel (i.e. random and fixed-effects) regression results
are shown to enable comparisons between results.
Table 4 presents both the pooled OLS and random effect (RE) regression
results of the relationship between corporate governance variables and
dividend policy measured by dividend payout (POUT). The first test Lagrange
Multiplier Test is 971.26 with the P-value at the 1% significance level. This
means that the panel modelis better than the pooled OLS model. In addition,
the Hausman Test for regression is 22.83 with the P-value equal to 0.4111,
which is insignificant, thus supporting thatthe random effects model is more
efficient than the fixed effects model. Both the OLS and RE models yield
similar the results. Board size (BSIZE) and board independence(BIND) have
significant positive effects on dividend policy, indicating that firms with a
large board size and more independent directors are more likely to pay higher
dividends. The result of board meeting (BMEET) in the RE model is different
to the finding in the OLS regression. It is positive but not statistically
significant at any levels. Again, the result of the RE model is similar to the
finding in the OLS regression showing significant negative relationships
between CEO duality and dividend policy. With respect to the ownership
variables, the results of the RE regression suggest that institutional ownership
(INS) has a significant positive relationship with POUT. However, managerial
ownership (INSID) has a significant negative effect on POUT, indicating that
the greater managerial ownership, the lower the dividend payout. In addition,
the results of the RE model show that an audit firm (BIG-4) has a significant
positive effect on dividend policy and this result is similar to the pooled OLS
results. However, unlike the pooled OLS results, firm age (FAGE) and
profitability (ROA) have no effect on dividends in the RE model.
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Table 4: Panel Regression Results of the Relationship between
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Dividend Policy (POUT)
Independent Variables

Pooled OLS Model

Random Effects Model

Const.

0.583*** (9.06)

0.512*** (5.72)

BSIZE

0.004* (1.82)

0.002* (1.67)

BIND

0.035** (1.97)

0.017** (2.02)

BMEET

0.004** (2.25)

0.001 (0.69)

DUALITY

-0.005* (-1.68)

-0.011* (-1.71)

-0.043 (-1.25)

-0.014 (-0.51)

-0.143*** (-2.39)

-0.007** (-2.11)

INS

0.081* (1.63)

0.026* (1.79)

STATE

-0.123 (-0.74)

-0.271 (-1.01)

FORGN

-0.028 (-0.49)

-0.050 (-1.01)

0.061*** (2.88)

0.016*** (2.97)

LOG FSIZE

0.001 (0.08)

0.004 (0.66)

LR

0.046 (1.42)

0.031 (0.75)

LOG MBVE

0.011 (1.14)

0.009 (0.97)

FRISK

-0.005 (-0.54)

0.005 (0.59)

FAGE

0.001* (1.80)

0.001 (1.02)

0.099*** (3.05)

0.027 (1.00)

INDS-DUM

Yes

Yes

YR-DUM

Yes

Yes

Observations

1438

1438

Adj-R-square

0.114

0.140

ACIND
INSID

BIG-4

ROA

Lagrange Multiplier test

971.26***

Lagrange Multiplier test

(0.000)

(P-value)
Hausman test

22.83

Hausman test (P-value)

(0.411)

Note: ***, **, * represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Tstatistics are in the parenthesis. All variables are as previously defined.

Table 5 presents the panel regression results of the association between
governance mechanisms and dividend policy measured by dividend yield
(DY). The Lagrange Multiplier Test is 345.55 and statistically significant at
the 1% level, indicating that the panel models are more appropriate than the
pooled OLS model. Again, the Hausman Test is 36.98 with the P-value
significant at the 5% level. This result supports that the fixed effects (FE)
model is preferred over the RE model. Using DY as the dividend policy
measure, the results of FE regression show that board size (BSIZE) and board
meeting (BMEET) have no significant positive influence on DY. This is
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inconsistent with the results from the pooled OLS model. Similarly, CEO
duality has no significant effect in the FE model. However, the results of the
FE model show that insider managerial ownership (INSID) has a significant
positive influence on DY, and foreign ownership (FORGN) has a significant
negative influence on DY but Big-4 shows no effect in the FE model. With
respect to control variables, both OLS and FE regressions show that market to
book value (MBVE) and firm risk (FRISK) have significant negative effects
on DY, indicating that firms with unstable profitability may have more
fluctuations in the firm's stock price and, hence, are more likely to pay lower
dividends. Again, unlike pooled OLS estimates, leverage ratio (LR) and
profitability (ROA) have no significant effect in the FE regression.
Table 5: Panel Regression Results of the Relationship between
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Dividend Policy (DY)
Independent Variables

Pooled OLS Model

Fixed Effects Model

Const.

0.054*** (7.68)

BSIZE

0.001*** (3.75)

-0.0001 (-0.52)

-0.007 (-1.58)

-0.004 (-0.81)

BMEET

0.001** (1.94)

0.001 (0.41)

DUALITY

-0.007* (-1.87)

-0.002 (-0.44)

ACIND

0.001 (0.14)

0.002 (0.58)

INSID

-0.03 (-0.47)

0.032*** (2.89)

INS

0.005 (0.93)

0.001 (0.31)

STATE

-0.002 (-0.11)

0.026 (0.46)

FORGN

-0.007 (-0.92)

-0.012* (-1.65)

0.006*** (2.42)

-0.004 (-0.67)

0.0001 (0.03)

0.0001 (0.28)

0.008** (2.12)

-0.002 (-0.30)

BIND

BIG-4
LOG FSIZE
LR
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LOG MBVE

-0.006*** (-5.60)

-0.004*** (-2.55)

FRISK

-0.002* (-1.67)

-0.002* (-1.70)

FAGE

-0.0001 (1.58)

-0.004 (-0.26)

0.012*** (3.05)

0.003 (0.78)

INDS-DUM

Yes

No

YR-DUM

Yes

Yes

Observations

1438

1438

Adj-R-square

0.163

0.164

ROA

Lagrange Multiplier test
Lagrange Multiplier test(Pvalue)
Hausman test

345.55***
(0.000)
36.98**(0.023)

Hausman test (P-value)

Note: ***, **, * represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. T-statistics are in the parenthesis.
All variables are as previously defined.

5.

Discussion on Panel Regression Results

This study examined whether the corporate governance variables affect dividend measures in
Australian listed firms. The regression results of panel models show that board size (BSIZE), board
independence (BIND), CEO duality (DUALITY), managerial ownership (INSID), institutional
ownership (INS), foreign ownership (FORGN) and audit firms (Big-4) have significant
relationships with dividend policy. The significant positive relationship between board size
(BSIZE) and dividend payoutis consistent with the argument that board size can influence a firm’s
dividend policy,that is, the larger the number of board members in Australian firms, the higher the
dividend payout. The result suggests increasing the board size would increase shareholders’ wealth
significantly. Large Australian firms tend to have a large sized board but they also have widespread
shareholdings and higher degrees of agency costs. So one explanation is that those firms paying
higher dividends have good governance and monitoring and control mechanisms in place. This
result is consistentwith the findings of La Porta et al. (2000a) who predicted that a large board
would provide a better governance environment, and thus ensure higher dividends. The obtained
results are also consistent with the findings of Bokpin (2011), Chen et al. (2011), Gill, and
Obradovich (2012). Therefore, this study supports the hypothesis H1a.
Similarly, board independence (BIND) has a significant positive influence on dividend policy,
implying the higher proportion of board independence in Australian firms can encourage a higher
dividend policy. This finding supports the argument thatmore active involvement of independent
directors would lead to greater protection of shareholders’ interests and thus result in higher
dividends. A significant positive relationship between board independence and dividend policy
could be viewed strongly as both mechanisms play a similarly important role in corporate
governance in Australian firms. The result is consistent with Easterbrook (1984), Schellenger et
al. (1989), and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) who document strong evidence that the board
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independence influences dividend policy. Therefore, this study supports hypothesis H1b that
Australian firms with a higher number of independent directors on the board tend to pay higher
dividends.
The study finds a significant negative relationship between CEO duality (DUALITY) and dividend
policy, suggesting that Australian firms with CEO duality tend to pay lower dividends compared
to firms who separate the roles of CEO and board chairman. In other words, firms with role
separation in CEO and board chairman are more likely to protect shareholders’ interests, and hence
pay more dividends. The negative significant relationship between CEO duality and dividend
policy is consistent with the findings of Baliga et al. (1996) and Dittmar et al. (2003). Therefore,
the hypothesis H2 is supported.
With respect to ownership variables, the finding is consistent with the argument that managerial
ownership and dividends could act as a substitutive monitoring device. The negative relationship
between managerial ownership (INSID) and dividend policy suggests that the greater the
managerial ownership the lower the payout. One possible reason is that managers with higher
ownership tend to behave opportunistically and self-interest driven, and when making finance
decisions managers are more likely to use free cash flows for their own benefits rather than paying
higher dividends. This finding is consistent with those of Rozeff (1982), Jensen (1986), Eckbo and
Verma (1994), Moh'd et al. (1995), Short et al. (2002), Chen et al. (2005), and Mehrani et al.
(2011). Therefore, the hypothesis H4a is marginally supported that Australian companies with
high managerial ownership prefer lower levels of payout, but higher levels of dividend yield.
Again, this study finds a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership (INS)
and dividend policy, which implies that firms with a higher percentage of shares held by
institutional investors are more likely to pay higher dividends. The positive relationship also
suggests that institutional ownership and dividend policy are not substitute monitoring
mechanisms rather they perform complementary governance roles in Australia. This result is
consistent with those found by Zeckhauser and Pound(1990), Moh'd et al. (1995), Short et al.
(2002). However, it is different from signalling theory that proposes that institutional investors
and dividends may be viewed as substitute signalling devices (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990).
Therefore, hypothesis H4b is supported. Further, the findings of this study show that Big-4
affiliated audit firms have a significant positive influence on dividend policy, suggesting that high
audit quality may restrict opportunistic behaviour of mangers and boards of directors, decrease
information symmetry, and hence restore investors' confidence. This result is consistent with those
found by Mitton (2002) and Lee, Cox, and Roden (2007). Therefore, the hypothesis H5 is
supported.
On the other hand, the results show that there is no significant relationship between board meetings
(BMEET) and dividend policy in Australian firms. Therefore, hypothesis H1c is not supported.
The results also show that audit committee independence (ACIND) does not have a significant
effect on dividends. Thus, the good practices of the audit committee have no effect on dividend
policy. The finding is consistent with Beasley and Salterio (2001), Cotter and Silvester (2003),
Turley and Zaman (2007), and Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2014) who do not find evidence to support
a significant effect for the audit committee. This result suggests that looking only at audit
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committee independence may not be sufficient to assess the effectiveness of the audit committee;
there might be a need to look at other factors such as audit committee financial expertise and
education of audit committee. Therefore, hypothesis H3 is not supported. This study does not find
any significant relationship between government (STATE) and dividend policy but finds a
negative relation for foreign ownership (FORGN). Therefore, the hypothesis H4c is not supported
while H4d is accepted.
6.

Conclusion and Implications

This study investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, namely board
characteristics, audit committee and ownership on dividend policy measured as dividend payout
and dividend yield for 206 ASX listed firms for the period from 2005 to 2011. The purpose is to
provide a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between dividend policy and
corporate governance mechanisms in all aspects. Using the random effects model, the results show
that the corporate governance mechanisms of board size, board independence, institutional
ownership and audit quality have significant positive influences on firm dividend payout decisions.
This positive relationship implies that the board and institutional investors use dividends as a
complementary mechanism to mitigate agency problems in Australian firms. However, the results
of the random effects model show that CEO duality and managerial ownership have significant
negative relationships with dividend payout. When dividend yield is used as proxy for firm
dividend policy, the results from fixed effects model show only managerial ownership and foreign
ownership have positive but insignificant and significant negative effects respectively. No other
governance variable has a significant effect on dividend yield, which is contrary to expectations.
The findings of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy have important
implications for companies, investors and policy makers. It suggests that dividend policy and
corporate governance mechanisms are complementary, thatis firms paying higher dividends are
more likely to engage in good governance practices as well as having strong monitoring and
control systems in place. Specifically, board size, board independence, institutional ownership,
Big-4 firms, and dividend policy can play complementary governance roles and provide more
benefits to shareholders and investors. On the other hand, shareholders and investors should be
cautious about CEO duality and managerial ownership, although fewer Australian firms have CEO
duality, and managerial ownership is at a reasonable level. As such, the possibility of opportunistic
behaviour of managers may not be ruled out when it comes to the decision whether or not they
should pay dividends to existing shareholders. This study is not without limitations. The tests
disregard the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as Australia had not been severely
affected by the GFC but the effect on governance mechanisms and dividend decisionsis possible.
Sample period is also limited up to 2011 covering second edition of the ASX Corporate
Governance Guidelines rather than third or fourth editions. Future research may extend study
period up to fourth edition of the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines covering issues that are
more complex. Future research may also examine the effects of corporate governance on dividend
policy for pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. Again, future research can investigate the interactions
between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure and their
joint impact on dividend policy.
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Appendix:

Variance Inflation Factors of the relationship between corporate governancemechanisms and
dividends
Dependent variables: POUT and DY
Independent Variables

VIF

BSIZE

1.33

BIND

1.15

BMEET

1.34

DUALITY

1.11

ACIND

1.35

INSID

1.12

INS

1.12

STATE

1.09

FORGN

1.15

BIG-4

1.42

LOG FSIZE

1.50

LR

1.20

LOG MBVE

1.09

FRISK

1.27

FAGE

1.41

ROA

1.03
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